Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad: Difference between revisions

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'''''Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad''''', is a book by academic [[Natana J. DeLong-Bas]], published in 2004 by [[Oxford University Press]]. It is based "on a close study of the 14 volumes" of collected works<ref name=ybarra/> of Wahhabism's founder, [[Ibn Abd al-Wahhab]] and has been called "the first extensive explication of the theology" of [[Wahhabism]].<ref name=ybarra>{{cite news|url=https://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB109027620568967848  |title=Books. In the Prophet's Name  [Review] |first=Michael J. |last=Ybarra|publisher=wsj.com|date=July 20, 2004}}</ref> The book "reveals" (according to its author), "a more moderate, sophisticated, and nuanced" interpretation of Islam than the "standard image" of Wahhabism.<ref name="DLB2004: 5">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 5</ref>
'''''Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad''''', is a book by academic [[Natana J. DeLong-Bas]], published in 2004 by [[Oxford University Press]]. It is based "on a close study of the 14 volumes" of collected works<ref name=ybarra/> of Wahhabism's founder, [[Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab]] and has been called "the first extensive explication of the theology" of [[Wahhabism]].<ref name=ybarra>{{cite news|url=https://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB109027620568967848  |title=Books. In the Prophet's Name  [Review] |first=Michael J. |last=Ybarra|publisher=wsj.com|date=July 20, 2004}}</ref> The book "reveals" (according to its author), "a more moderate, sophisticated, and nuanced" interpretation of Islam than the "standard image" of Wahhabism.<ref name="DLB2004: 5">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 5</ref>


The work is divided into sections: a brief religious biography and history of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, his "theology and world view", Islamic law, women and Wahhabism, ''jihad'' and the evolution of Wahhabism.<ref name=B&N>{{cite web|title=Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Overview  [blurb]|url=http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/wahhabi-islam-natana-delong-bas/1117395956?ean=9780195333015|website=Barnes & Noble|quote=She focuses on four areas: theology, legal theory, proselytizing through education and jihad, and law on women.}}</ref>
The work is divided into sections: a brief religious biography and history of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, his "theology and world view", Islamic law, women and Wahhabism, ''jihad'' and the evolution of Wahhabism.<ref name=B&N>{{cite web|title=Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Overview  [blurb]|url=http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/wahhabi-islam-natana-delong-bas/1117395956?ean=9780195333015|website=Barnes & Noble|quote=She focuses on four areas: theology, legal theory, proselytizing through education and jihad, and law on women.}}</ref>
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According to the author, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab has been misunderstood by historians, who have portrayed his teachings as rigid, literal, and extreme.
According to the author, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab has been misunderstood by historians, who have portrayed his teachings as rigid, literal, and extreme.


In many dozens of places throughout her book DeLong-Bas contradicts "preconceived notions" and "negative stereotypes"<ref name="DLB2004: 364">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 364</ref><ref>index has a subheading for "Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, negative stereotypes of"</ref> of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, contrasting them with his level of expertise -- "a well-trained and widely traveled scholar and jurist";<ref name="DLB2004: 5">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 5</ref> his true beliefs, interests and approach—a devotion "to the concept of social justice”, concern with  "the protection of women and the poor";<ref name="DLB2004: 17">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 17</ref>  preference “to win converts through discussion, debate, and persuasion rather than force”,<ref name="DLB2004: 35">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 35</ref> call for  “fighting and military engagements” in the “struggle against unbelievers (''[[kuffar]]'') and hypocrites (''[[munafiq]]'')“ only as a “last resort” after “education and the call to Islam” had failed.<ref name="DLB2004: 33">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 33</ref>
In many dozens of places throughout her book DeLong-Bas contradicts "preconceived notions" and "negative stereotypes"<ref name="DLB2004: 364">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 364</ref>{{#tag:ref|index has a subheading for "Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, negative stereotypes of"|group=Note}} of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, contrasting them with his level of expertise -- "a well-trained and widely traveled scholar and jurist";<ref name="DLB2004: 5">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 5</ref> his true beliefs, interests and approach—a devotion "to the concept of social justice”, concern with  "the protection of women and the poor";<ref name="DLB2004: 17">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 17</ref>  preference “to win converts through discussion, debate, and persuasion rather than force”,<ref name="DLB2004: 35">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 35</ref> call for  “fighting and military engagements” in the “struggle against unbelievers (''[[kuffar]]'') and hypocrites (''[[munafiq]]'')“ only as a “last resort” after “education and the call to Islam” had failed.<ref name="DLB2004: 33">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 33</ref>


His enmity towards non-Muslims has also been overstated, DeLong-Bas believes. He did not "divide the world" into Wahhabis and non-Wahhabis.<ref name="DLB2004: 83">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 83</ref> And while he did "at times" make "vehement denunciations" of them, he "never called for their destruction or death“.<ref name="DLB2004: 61">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 61</ref>  "Even in the case of jihad, if Muslims find themselves in need” Ibn Abd al-Wahhab stated that “they may enter the territory of non-Muslims tribes that are friendly to them, [to take what they need] though only with the express permission of the imam.”
His enmity towards non-Muslims has also been overstated, DeLong-Bas believes. He did not "divide the world" into Wahhabis and non-Wahhabis.<ref name="DLB2004: 83">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 83</ref> And while he did "at times" make "vehement denunciations" of them, he "never called for their destruction or death“.<ref name="DLB2004: 61">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 61</ref>  "Even in the case of jihad, if Muslims find themselves in need” Ibn Abd al-Wahhab stated that “they may enter the territory of non-Muslims tribes that are friendly to them, [to take what they need] though only with the express permission of the imam.”
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According to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, ''shirk'' (or as the author refers to it, "associationism"), is much more than believing in more than one God.  Among the most serious examples of ''shirk'' are “worshiping, sacrificing to, slaughtering to, praying to, invoking, seeking intercession by, or attributing authority to anyone or anything other than God.” This include intercession by the Muslim prophet [[Muhammad]]<ref name="DLB2004: 69">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 69</ref>
According to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, ''shirk'' (or as the author refers to it, "associationism"), is much more than believing in more than one God.  Among the most serious examples of ''shirk'' are “worshiping, sacrificing to, slaughtering to, praying to, invoking, seeking intercession by, or attributing authority to anyone or anything other than God.” This include intercession by the Muslim prophet [[Muhammad]]<ref name="DLB2004: 69">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 69</ref>
<ref>(While a hadith does say that Muhammad plans to petition God on behalf of good Muslim monotheists on Judgment Day, the hadith does not say it is permissible to ''ask'' Muhammad for intercession. (p.70))</ref>  
{{#tag:ref|(While a hadith does say that Muhammad plans to petition God on behalf of good Muslim monotheists on Judgment Day, the hadith does not say it is permissible to ''ask'' Muhammad for intercession. (p.70))<ref name="DLB2004: 70">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 70</ref>|group=Note}}
But calling on “anyone or anything" other than God for help or anything else is ''shirk'', and "is strictly, totally, and permanently forbidden", because ‘this calling signifies worship of the one called upon`",
But calling on “anyone or anything" other than God for help or anything else is ''shirk'', and "is strictly, totally, and permanently forbidden", because ‘this calling signifies worship of the one called upon`",
<ref name="IAWKT: 30">[[#IAWKT|Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', 1398h]]: 30</ref><ref name="DLB2004: 63">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 63</ref> and worship accords "godlike status to created beings and objects.”<ref name="DLB2004: 63"/>    Anyone who requests intercession or who believes "in the power of requesting for intercession "must be  fought until they adhere to monotheism".<ref name="DLB2004: 63"/>
<ref name="IAWKT: 30">[[#IAWKT|Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', 1398h]]: 30</ref><ref name="DLB2004: 63">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 63</ref> and worship accords "godlike status to created beings and objects.”<ref name="DLB2004: 63"/>    Anyone who requests intercession or who believes "in the power of requesting for intercession "must be  fought until they adhere to monotheism".<ref name="DLB2004: 63"/>
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Contrary to the association of IAW’s school of Islam with literalism and  mindless rote memorization, IAW declared `The key of knowledge is questions.`<ref name="DLB2004: 107">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 107</ref> He “insisted on establishing the context of particular verses" of the Quran or hadith “so as to avoid a literal interpretation,” found the emphasis on memorization in the religious sciences to be “problematic”,<ref name="DLB2004: 107-8"/> highlighted the importance of the intent and spirit behind the actions taken rather than the ritualism involved,<ref name="DLB2004: 115">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 115</ref>  and denounced literalist ulama  "for their ignorance,” and “rigidity.”<ref name="DLB2004: 117">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 117</ref>
Contrary to the association of IAW’s school of Islam with literalism and  mindless rote memorization, IAW declared `The key of knowledge is questions.`<ref name="DLB2004: 107">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 107</ref> He “insisted on establishing the context of particular verses" of the Quran or hadith “so as to avoid a literal interpretation,” found the emphasis on memorization in the religious sciences to be “problematic”,<ref name="DLB2004: 107-8"/> highlighted the importance of the intent and spirit behind the actions taken rather than the ritualism involved,<ref name="DLB2004: 115">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 115</ref>  and denounced literalist ulama  "for their ignorance,” and “rigidity.”<ref name="DLB2004: 117">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 117</ref>


Another claim of some critics—that IAW was a “blind” follower of jurist [[Ibn Taymiyya]]—is contradicted by the fact that only three of 170 citations in his work ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', refer to the works of Ibn Taymiyya.<ref name="DLB2004: 108">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 108</ref><ref>"When pressed to choose between rulings by [[Ibn Hanbal]] and Ibn Taymiyya", he declined to choose,  "preferring to return directly" to the Quran and Sunnah "to form his own scripturally based opinion." (p.111)</ref>
Another claim of some critics—that IAW was a “blind” follower of jurist [[Ibn Taymiyya]]—is contradicted by the fact that only three of 170 citations in his work ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', refer to the works of Ibn Taymiyya.<ref name="DLB2004: 108">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 108</ref>{{#tag:ref|"When pressed to choose between rulings by [[Ibn Hanbal]] and Ibn Taymiyya", he declined to choose,  "preferring to return directly" to the Quran and Sunnah "to form his own scripturally based opinion."<ref name="DLB2004: 111">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 111</ref>|group=Note}}


Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably to fiqh, and did not consider “the opinion of any law school to be binding.”<ref name="DLB2004: 112-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 112-3</ref>  He did, however,  follow the Hanbali methodology of extreme conservatism in interpretation of the Sharia.<ref name="DLB2004: 112-3"/>
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably to fiqh, and did not consider “the opinion of any law school to be binding.”<ref name="DLB2004: 112-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 112-3</ref>  He did, however,  follow the Hanbali methodology of extreme conservatism in interpretation of the Sharia.<ref name="DLB2004: 112-3"/>
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====Sex with slave girls====
====Sex with slave girls====


DeLong-Bas states that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab "declared sexual relations with slave women to be forbidden because they occurred outside of marriage."<ref name="DLB2004: 131"/> While he never used the Islamic term for forbidden, "''[[haram]]''",<ref>"...he does not use the word haram..." footnote on page 317</ref> she notes that he did state that "it is preferable (''afdal'')" and "a supererogatory act of worship" (i.e. going beyond what duty requires) for a slave owner "to give it up/withdraw" from sex with any slave girls/women he might own.<ref name="DLB2004: 128">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 128</ref>  He also taught that "it is preferable for" a slave owner to emancipate and marry any slave/servant woman who had bears him a child.<ref name="DLB2004: 131"/>
DeLong-Bas states that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab "declared sexual relations with slave women to be forbidden because they occurred outside of marriage."<ref name="DLB2004: 131"/> While he never used the Islamic term for forbidden, "''[[haram]]''",{{#tag:ref|"...he does not use the word haram..." footnote on page 317|group=Note}} she notes that he did state that "it is preferable (''afdal'')" and "a supererogatory act of worship" (i.e. going beyond what duty requires) for a slave owner "to give it up/withdraw" from sex with any slave girls/women he might own.<ref name="DLB2004: 128">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 128</ref>  He also taught that "it is preferable for" a slave owner to emancipate and marry any slave/servant woman who had bears him a child.<ref name="DLB2004: 131"/>


====Marriage====
====Marriage====
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# determination of the spouses-to-be, (this avoids mistakes "such as the confusion of one daughter or sister for another".<ref name="DLB2004: 135">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 135</ref>)
# determination of the spouses-to-be, (this avoids mistakes "such as the confusion of one daughter or sister for another".<ref name="DLB2004: 135">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 135</ref>)
# consent of the spouses-to-be,
# consent of the spouses-to-be,
# contracting of the marriage by a male guardian (''[[Wali (Islamic legal guardian)|wali]]'') (IAW "taught that any marriage contracted by someone other than the girl/woman's marriage guardian even if it is the woman herself, is not valid and the marriage is void," since "a girl/woman "giving herself in marriage was tantamount to [[harlot]]ry."<ref name="DLB2004: 140">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 140</ref> The guardian should verify that the husband-to-be is a Muslim, mature, honorable, is sexually and intellectually able, and is not a slave.<ref name="DLB2004: 142">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 142</ref> The guardian should be the bride’s father, but in the event the father could not, IAW gives a "[[order of succession]]" of various male relatives.<ref>assignment of guardianship: to the woman's brother, if he was unavailable,  to the paternal grandfather, than to the woman's son, than to the tribe of the brother, "unless it is law/base/despicable",  then to the paternal uncle, followed by his son, then other relatives in paternal relationships, and if there are no male paternal relatives, to male maternal relatives. (p.142)</ref>  
# contracting of the marriage by a male guardian (''[[Wali (Islamic legal guardian)|wali]]'') (IAW "taught that any marriage contracted by someone other than the girl/woman's marriage guardian even if it is the woman herself, is not valid and the marriage is void," since "a girl/woman "giving herself in marriage was tantamount to [[harlot]]ry."<ref name="DLB2004: 140">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 140</ref> The guardian should verify that the husband-to-be is a Muslim, mature, honorable, is sexually and intellectually able, and is not a slave.<ref name="DLB2004: 142">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 142</ref> The guardian should be the bride’s father, but in the event the father could not, IAW gives a "[[order of succession]]" of various male relatives.{{#tag:ref|assignment of guardianship: to the woman's brother, if he was unavailable,  to the paternal grandfather, than to the woman's son, than to the tribe of the brother, "unless it is law/base/despicable",  then to the paternal uncle, followed by his son, then other relatives in paternal relationships, and if there are no male paternal relatives, to male maternal relatives.<ref name="DLB2004: 142">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 142</ref>|group=Note}}
# presence of two reliable/just witnesses, (there must be "two male witness of just and reliable character at the conclusion of the marriage contract." If one or more male witnesses are unavailable, two female witnesses are acceptable as the equivalent of one male witness and may be substituted.)<ref name="DLB2004: 144">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 144</ref>
# presence of two reliable/just witnesses, (there must be "two male witness of just and reliable character at the conclusion of the marriage contract." If one or more male witnesses are unavailable, two female witnesses are acceptable as the equivalent of one male witness and may be substituted.)<ref name="DLB2004: 144">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 144</ref>
# equality of status between the man the woman.<ref name="DLB2004: 135"/> (This refers not to the husband and wife having equal status in their marriage but to whether the groom comes from a background of equal social status to the bride.  This is so important that if the guardian "was not aware of the man's lower status prior to the marriage," he can request the marriage be rendered invalid, "regardless of the opinion of the bride".  DeLong-Bas writes that this "reflects his responsibility to ensure that the woman is married to an appropriate man." Because a marriage to "a man of lower social status would lower the woman's status...")<ref name="DLB2004: 145">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 145</ref>{{#tag:ref|One case of a marriage being invalidated due to husband’s status was the August 2005 Saudi court-ordered divorce of a 34-year old mother of two (named Fatima Mansour) from her husband, Mansur, despite the fact that were happily married and her father (now deceased) had approved the marriage. The divorce was initiated by her half-brother using his powers as her male guardian, who alleged that his half-sister's husband was from a tribe of a low status compared to the status of her tribe and that the husband had failed to disclose this when he first asked for Fatima’s hand. Fatima declared her fear of domestic at her brother’s home (sources: <ref>{{cite web|title=SAUDI ARABIA : Fatima A. Fear for Safety|url=http://www.amnesty.be/doc/spip.php?page=imprimir_articulo&id_article=9976|work=06 February 2007|publisher=Amnesty International, Belgique Francophone|accessdate=23 February 2014}}</ref> {{cite news|last=AL NAFJAN|first=EMAN|title=Saudi Arabia, My Changing Home|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/saudi-arabia-my-changing-home.html?_r=0|newspaper=New York Times |accessdate=23 February 2014|date=June 8, 2012}}), and was sufficiently concerned to spend four years in jail with her one-year-old daughter before the Supreme Judicial Council overturned the decision.(source: {{cite book|author=House, Karen Elliott|title=On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future| publisher=Knopf|year=2012|page=100}})</ref>|group=Note}}
# equality of status between the man the woman.<ref name="DLB2004: 135"/> (This refers not to the husband and wife having equal status in their marriage but to whether the groom comes from a background of equal social status to the bride.  This is so important that if the guardian "was not aware of the man's lower status prior to the marriage," he can request the marriage be rendered invalid, "regardless of the opinion of the bride".  DeLong-Bas writes that this "reflects his responsibility to ensure that the woman is married to an appropriate man." Because a marriage to "a man of lower social status would lower the woman's status...")<ref name="DLB2004: 145">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 145</ref>{{#tag:ref|One case of a marriage being invalidated due to husband’s status was the August 2005 Saudi court-ordered divorce of a 34-year old mother of two (named Fatima Mansour) from her husband, Mansur, despite the fact that were happily married and her father (now deceased) had approved the marriage. The divorce was initiated by her half-brother using his powers as her male guardian, who alleged that his half-sister's husband was from a tribe of a low status compared to the status of her tribe and that the husband had failed to disclose this when he first asked for Fatima’s hand. Fatima declared her fear of domestic at her brother’s home (sources: <ref>{{cite web|title=SAUDI ARABIA : Fatima A. Fear for Safety|url=http://www.amnesty.be/doc/spip.php?page=imprimir_articulo&id_article=9976|work=06 February 2007|publisher=Amnesty International, Belgique Francophone|accessdate=23 February 2014}}</ref> {{cite news|last=AL NAFJAN|first=EMAN|title=Saudi Arabia, My Changing Home|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/saudi-arabia-my-changing-home.html?_r=0|newspaper=New York Times |accessdate=23 February 2014|date=June 8, 2012}}), and was sufficiently concerned to spend four years in jail with her one-year-old daughter before the Supreme Judicial Council overturned the decision.(source: {{cite book|author=House, Karen Elliott|title=On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future| publisher=Knopf|year=2012|page=100}})</ref>|group=Note}}
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IAW “went to great lengths to emphasize" that the husband's right to strike his wife is not "a license for committing violence" against her, nor does "it make domestic violence a religious prescription or right". The "purpose of the blow" is only "to emphasize the admonition ..."<ref name="DLB2004: 171">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 171</ref>
IAW “went to great lengths to emphasize" that the husband's right to strike his wife is not "a license for committing violence" against her, nor does "it make domestic violence a religious prescription or right". The "purpose of the blow" is only "to emphasize the admonition ..."<ref name="DLB2004: 171">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 171</ref>


"Men can also be considered ''nushuz'' if they neglect their martial duties." <ref name="DLB2004: 171"/><ref>(Although nothing is said of a woman hitting her husband.)</ref>
"Men can also be considered ''nushuz'' if they neglect their martial duties." <ref name="DLB2004: 171"/>{{#tag:ref| (Although nothing is said of a woman hitting her husband.)|group=Note}}


;Divorce
;Divorce
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"Defensive" in this case, however, does not mean fighting off attackers or harassers, but fighting those who have rejected the call to Islam, refused to recognize Muslim hegemony by paying tribute. Christians and Jews (People of the Book) are to pay the special ''[[jizyah]]'' poll tax, "in recognition of Muslim hegemony and in exchange for protected status." Those who refuse are actually making a "choice" to fight the Muslims, "rendering them the aggressors in the conflict", according to the author.<ref name="DLB2004: 200">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 200</ref>
"Defensive" in this case, however, does not mean fighting off attackers or harassers, but fighting those who have rejected the call to Islam, refused to recognize Muslim hegemony by paying tribute. Christians and Jews (People of the Book) are to pay the special ''[[jizyah]]'' poll tax, "in recognition of Muslim hegemony and in exchange for protected status." Those who refuse are actually making a "choice" to fight the Muslims, "rendering them the aggressors in the conflict", according to the author.<ref name="DLB2004: 200">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 200</ref>


Further proof that "the degree of violence" in jihad encouraged by Wahhabis "is not as extreme" as has often been portrayed, is that IAW "specifically used the Arab term" for `fighting` (''qaatala'') rather than `killing` (''qatala'') in talking about jihad.<ref name="DLB2004: 203"/><ref>Although DeLong-Bas notes " ... it may be assumed that some killing is likely to occur during the process of fighting ..." (p.203).</ref>
Further proof that "the degree of violence" in jihad encouraged by Wahhabis "is not as extreme" as has often been portrayed, is that IAW "specifically used the Arab term" for `fighting` (''qaatala'') rather than `killing` (''qatala'') in talking about jihad.<ref name="DLB2004: 203"/>{{#tag:ref|Although DeLong-Bas notes " ... it may be assumed that some killing is likely to occur during the process of fighting ..." <ref name="DLB2004: 203">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 203</ref>|group=Note}}


''Jihad'' "can only be declared by the religious leader (''imam'')",<ref name="DLB2004: 202-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 202-3</ref>  who is also responsible for making sure rules of ''jihad'' are followed, for distributing funds from the treasury (''[[Bayt al-Mal]]''),<ref name="DLB2004: 211">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 211</ref> and concluding truces and treaties with the enemy whereby they acknowledge Muslim jurisdiction and pay ''[[jizyah]]'' tax.<ref name="DLB2004: 211"/>
''Jihad'' "can only be declared by the religious leader (''imam'')",<ref name="DLB2004: 202-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 202-3</ref>  who is also responsible for making sure rules of ''jihad'' are followed, for distributing funds from the treasury (''[[Bayt al-Mal]]''),<ref name="DLB2004: 211">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 211</ref> and concluding truces and treaties with the enemy whereby they acknowledge Muslim jurisdiction and pay ''[[jizyah]]'' tax.<ref name="DLB2004: 211"/>
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;Booty
;Booty


Also subject to strict regulations is the dividing of booty taken from the enemy after the jihad.<ref>IAW distinguished between two types of booty.  
Also subject to strict regulations is the dividing of booty taken from the enemy after the jihad.{{#tag:ref|IAW distinguished between two types of booty.  
#''al-ghanimah'' -- the spoils of war, captured by the Muslim army after battle, 4/5s of which are to be distributed among those Muslims who participated in the fighting.
#''al-ghanimah'' -- the spoils of war, captured by the Muslim army after battle, 4/5s of which are to be distributed among those Muslims who participated in the fighting.
#''fai'' -- spoils surrendered by non-Muslim enemy without fighting, considered to be  
#''fai'' -- spoils surrendered by non-Muslim enemy without fighting, considered to be  
the common possession of the whole Muslim society and divided up and distributed by the amir. (p.212)</ref>  
the common possession of the whole Muslim society and divided up and distributed by the amir. (p.212)<ref name="DLB2004: 212">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 212</ref>|group=Note}}
Clothing, personal jewelry ... and weaponry are considered the property of the individual who took them."<ref name="DLB2004: 215">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 215</ref>  Riding animals, not just human fighters also got their own share of booty.<ref name="DLB2004: 216">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 216</ref>
Clothing, personal jewelry ... and weaponry are considered the property of the individual who took them."<ref name="DLB2004: 215">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 215</ref>  Riding animals, not just human fighters also got their own share of booty.<ref name="DLB2004: 216">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 216</ref>


After fighting was done, booty collected, and inspected to make sure none came from non-enemy sources,<ref name="DLB2004: 212-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 212-3</ref> It was to be divided, with four fifths of the money and property going to the leader (''[[emir]]'') and the ''mujahidin'',<ref name="DLB2004: 212"/> and the rest reserved for  orphans, the poor, and the `sons of the path`.<ref name="DLB2004: 214"/>
After fighting was done, booty collected, and inspected to make sure none came from non-enemy sources,<ref name="DLB2004: 212-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 212-3</ref> It was to be divided, with four fifths of the money and property going to the leader (''[[emir]]'') and the ''mujahidin'',<ref name="DLB2004: 212"/> and the rest reserved for  orphans, the poor, and the `sons of the path`.<ref name="DLB2004: 214"/>
<ref>rewarding "specific individuals who desire special items" is forbidden prior to the division of the booty, as is giving a  portion of the booty to a tribe hired to participate in the jihad. All this ensures "jihad will not become a means of seeking wealth, privilege, or special status." (p.213)</ref>
{{#tag:ref|rewarding "specific individuals who desire special items" is forbidden prior to the division of the booty, as is giving a  portion of the booty to a tribe hired to participate in the jihad. All this ensures "jihad will not become a means of seeking wealth, privilege, or special status."<ref name="DLB2004: 213">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 213</ref>|group=Note}}


Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught that "only "worn and undesirable robes [''thobes'') captured in battle could be worn, only "emaciated" riding animals could be ridden.<ref name="DLB2004: 216"/>  Weapons could be taken from the enemy only "in such a way" that the enemy was not "cast down ... by it."<ref name="DLB2004: 215"/>
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught that "only "worn and undesirable robes [''thobes'') captured in battle could be worn, only "emaciated" riding animals could be ridden.<ref name="DLB2004: 216"/>  Weapons could be taken from the enemy only "in such a way" that the enemy was not "cast down ... by it."<ref name="DLB2004: 215"/>
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;Slaves as Booty
;Slaves as Booty


Booty included people, but as mentioned before "IAW was careful to note that the taking of a female captive does not entitle the owner to sexual relations with her ...." <ref>As mentioned above, IAW believed that not having sex with a slave girl/woman was "a supererogatory act of worship"</ref>
Booty included people, but as mentioned before "IAW was careful to note that the taking of a female captive does not entitle the owner to sexual relations with her ...." {{#tag:ref|As mentioned above, IAW believed that not having sex with a slave girl/woman was "a supererogatory act of worship" |group=Note}}
"Here again he broke with other law schools in his concern for human dignity and welfare..."<ref name="DLB2004: 215"/>
"Here again he broke with other law schools in his concern for human dignity and welfare..."<ref name="DLB2004: 215"/>


One restriction some of the non-Muslim (non-Wahhabi) enemy may not have appreciated was on the return of women and children taken captive. Although they had to remain captive/slave and not return home, this captivity provided them "with the opportunity to become Muslims themselves".<ref name="DLB2004: 207"/> If they were sold as slaves it had to be to another Muslim.<ref>"Although the Muslim `owner` technically has the right to sell a slave, IAW insisted that this can only be to another Muslim." (p.208)</ref>
One restriction some of the non-Muslim (non-Wahhabi) enemy may not have appreciated was on the return of women and children taken captive. Although they had to remain captive/slave and not return home, this captivity provided them "with the opportunity to become Muslims themselves".<ref name="DLB2004: 207"/> If they were sold as slaves it had to be to another Muslim.{{#tag:ref|"Although the Muslim `owner` technically has the right to sell a slave, IAW insisted that this can only be to another Muslim."<ref name="DLB2004: 208">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 208</ref>|group=Note}}


;Dhimmi and jihad
;Dhimmi and jihad


Post-jihad, the conquered non-Muslim "dhimmi" in a "treaty relationship" were  "entitled to remain on their property in exchange" for obedience and paying taxes applied to non-Muslims -- "the land tax (''[[kharaj]]'') and the poll tax (''jizyah'')." IAW "specifically forbade Muslims from overtaxing their subjects,"<ref name="DLB2004: 217">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 217</ref> or from purchasing the subjects land.<ref>this prohibition ensured that "those who were conquered" maintained "their property and enter[ed] into a treaty relationship with the Muslims. Thus, it remains clear that even the aftermath of jihad is not intended to serve as a means of enriching the Muslims; rather it is designed to encourage those whom they have conquered either to submit to Islam or to enter into treaty relationship with the Muslims. This hardly matches the typical historical image of the Wahhabis as bloodthirsty murderers of any and all who disagreed with them." (p.217)</ref>
Post-jihad, the conquered non-Muslim "dhimmi" in a "treaty relationship" were  "entitled to remain on their property in exchange" for obedience and paying taxes applied to non-Muslims -- "the land tax (''[[kharaj]]'') and the poll tax (''jizyah'')." IAW "specifically forbade Muslims from overtaxing their subjects,"<ref name="DLB2004: 217">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 217</ref> or from purchasing the subjects land.{{#tag:ref|this prohibition ensured that "those who were conquered" maintained "their property and enter[ed] into a treaty relationship with the Muslims. Thus, it remains clear that even the aftermath of jihad is not intended to serve as a means of enriching the Muslims; rather it is designed to encourage those whom they have conquered either to submit to Islam or to enter into treaty relationship with the Muslims. This hardly matches the typical historical image of the Wahhabis as bloodthirsty murderers of any and all who disagreed with them."<ref name="DLB2004: 217">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 217</ref>|group=Note}}


Revenue from these taxes and from property abandoned by non-believers fleeing ''jihad'' became the collective property of the Muslims, with "no distinctions to be made in terms of combatants versus noncombatants, age, or social or financial status", with the exception of the portion that went "to the leader to be used at his discretion".<ref name="DLB2004: 217"/>
Revenue from these taxes and from property abandoned by non-believers fleeing ''jihad'' became the collective property of the Muslims, with "no distinctions to be made in terms of combatants versus noncombatants, age, or social or financial status", with the exception of the portion that went "to the leader to be used at his discretion".<ref name="DLB2004: 217"/>

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